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Abstract
Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) are increasingly being adopted in a wide range of industries such as smart
power grids. Even though the rapid proliferation of CPSs brings huge benefits to our society, it also provides
potential attackers with many new opportunities to affect the physical world such as disrupting the services
controlled by CPSs. Stuxnet is an example of such an attack that was designed to interrupt the Iranian nuclear
program. In this paper, we show how the vulnerabilities exploited by Stuxnet could have been addressed at
the design level. We utilize a system theoretic approach, based on prior research on system safety, that takes
both physical and cyber components into account to analyze the threats exploited by Stuxnet. We conclude
that such an approach is capable of identifying cyber threats towards CPSs at the design level and provide
practical recommendations that CPS designers can utilize to design a more secure CPS.
Index Terms
CPS security design, Stuxnet analysis, CPS, STAMP, Security and safety analysis.
1. INTRODUCTION
THE increased challenges of today’s life such as energy scarcity, require the integration of computingintelligence into physical world. Cyber physical systems (CPS) [1] such as industrial control systems
are examples of such integration where the effects on physical world are controlled through the use of smart
technologies created by computers [2].
With physical manifestations in the real world, attacks on CPSs can cause disruption to physical services
or create a national disaster. As a cyber physical system requires a tight coupling between the physical and
cyber controlling components, it is crucial to ensure that the system is not only safe but also secure for
all the cyber and physical processes. Therefore, protecting the CPSs’ against cyber attacks is of paramount
importance.
Traditional IT security methods can be applied to protect a CPS, such as a critical infrastructure system,
against cyber threats or threats imposed by malicious insiders. However, due to the unique characteristics
of a CPS, traditional IT security strategies and approaches are not sufficient enough to address the security
challenges of a CPS [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]. For example, installing security patches or numerous system
updates that require taking the system offline is difficult, not economically justifiable, and often not feasible.
Also, new updates or security patches may create other problems such as in a case where a nuclear power
plant accidentally was shutdown after a software update [9]. Recently, it has been shown that attackers can
take control of air planes by having access to Wi-Fi services provided by the planes [10].
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Most of the efforts for protecting CPSs or even standards such as NIST 800-53 have focused on applying
traditional IT security mechanisms to threats such as those enumerated above. Although these efforts can
provide guidance and recommendations in improving the security of a CPS, they are not enough. There is
a lack of a framework for assessing the security in designing a CPS or evaluating the level of the security
guarantee in a functional CPS at the design level.
In this paper, we utilize a system theoretic framework to evaluate and enhance the security of CPSs. The
framework can be used in CPS attack modeling and threat assessment as well as diagnosis methods for
stealthy attacks against a CPS. We evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed framework in terms of finding
vulnerabilities and protecting a CPS by applying it to the Stuxnet case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on CPSs. Section 3 discusses
the traditional approaches for evaluating safety and security in CPSs. In section 4, we review how Stuxnet
works and infects the CPSs. Section 5 contains a thorough application of proposed security analysis scheme
on Stuxnet. Section 6 summarizes the results of our analysis.
2. CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
A cyber physical system (CPS) is a system that provides the control of physical components through cyber-
based commands. It is a physical system whose operations are integrated, monitored, and/or controlled by a
computational core [1]. By integrating actuators, control processing units, sensors, and communication cores,
a CPS forms a control loop for each of the physical component of the system.
The main components of a CPS are SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition), DCS (distributed
control system), and PLC (program logic controller) [11]. The main role of SCADA is to gather and
control geographically dispersed assets ranging from controlling sensors within a plant to controlling power
dissemination in a country. SCADAs are widely used in various critical infrastructures such as electrical
power grids, water distribution systems, and oil refineries. DCS on the other hand, controls the controllers
that are grouped together to carry out a specific task within the same geographically location. Both SCADA
and DCS use PLC devices to control the industrial components and processes. PLCs are typically programmed
from a Windows-based machine by an operator. The operator uses SCADA and DCS for various controlling
tasks such as process monitoring and configuring control parameters.
Due to the critical nature of a CPS, strong security and privacy mechanisms are needed to restrict
unauthorized access to the critical components of a CPS. Traditionally, industrial control systems were
considered secured as long as they are air-gapped, not connected to outside world. This notion is not valid
anymore as more and more industrial control systems are connecting to outside of their perimeter for various
reasons such as providing better services similar to smart grids or updating their softwares. Futhermore,
having a direct connection to outside world is not necessary to make a CPS vulnerable to cyber attacks.
Cases like Stuxnet has shown that even without direct connections to outside cyber world, cyber physical
systems are still vulnerable.
Most approaches for increasing the level of security within a CPS look at securing the individual
components of the CPS (i.e. security at component level) such as sensors, PLCs, actuators, or communication
protocols [12]. These approaches consider each component inside a CPS in isolation and follow the standard
practices to make the component secure against security threats such as input validation or firmware
tampering.
Although the security of individual components is important, it is not enough. A CPS can be attacked
by compromising the interaction between components without hacking the individual components within a
CPS [13]. By creating changes in the interaction of components, attackers create different outputs than what
was requested by the operators. For example, an attacker can cause delays in transferring the information
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING 3
from sensors to SCADA, triggering unwanted actions imposed by the delay in receiving the requested results
by SCADA. Attackers can also create nuisance alarms to desensitize operators to react to a real CPS problem
in the long run. Then, they launch their actual malicious command after the nuisance alarm attack.
One of the key advantages of cyber physical systems is networking the different components of the systems
for providing better and efficient services. In a network environment where all nodes are considered trusted,
every component of the system (inside or outside) can be a potential entry point for attackers. Thus, the
entry points for attackers are increased as the sizes of CPS network increases. In addition, due to employing
different devices from different vendors, it is difficult to create a unified security enforcement mechanism.
Often securing the servers and SCADAs overshadows the security of other low level important components
and attackers take the advantage of that. Therefore, identifying all critical control points and the component
interactions that affect those points are of paramount importance to enhance the security of a CPS. As CPSs
get more complex, a system-theoretic approach that considers system complexity can help to properly address
the security of a complex CPS at the design level. Such an approach should be able to identify the vulnerable
points, subsystem interactions and their effects on vulnerable points and provide recommendations on how
to increase the security of a CPS.
3. RELATED TECHNIQUES FOR SAFETY AND SECURITY ANALYSIS IN CPS
Traditionally, several approaches are available for safety analysis in CPS [14]. Among the most popular
ones are Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [15], Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [16], Hazard Analysis
and Critical Control Points (HACCP), and Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) [16].
Most of the traditional approaches are based on risk assessment and risk analysis of a system and can be
defined as a set of systematic methods for performing the following
• Identifying hazards-a situation with the potential for creating damage
– Hazards related to actions: undesirable system actions are taken or desirable system actions are not
taken
– Hazards related to timing: A desirable system actions is performed too soon or too late
– Hazards related to sequence: A desired action in a sequence of actions is skipped or the actions in
a sequence are performed out of order
– Hazards related to amounts: A desired action is performed too much or too little.
• Quantifying risks-the likelihood of a specific effect within a specified period
• Determining components safety measures
However, none of these traditional techniques are geared towards addressing the threats that compromise
the interactions among components in a CPS because these approaches consider individual components or
subsystems in isolation in addressing the safety of a CPS. In addition, since these approaches are mainly
designed for safety analysis, they can not be used effectively to address the security concerns in a CPS as
safety and security are different in nature. A system may be safe but not secure. For example. a system can
allow unauthorized modifications of the control parameters within the safe range without being detected by
system safety controllers, creating undesirable output that was not requested by the operator. In this section
we overview the above mentioned approaches and discuss their limitations in addressing the security issues
in a CPS.
A. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
FMEA is performed to identify individual failure modes of a system or its components and how they can
affect the system reliability in general. Failure modes are situations or conditions that cause a failure to occur.
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However, failure effects are consequences a particular failure mode can have on the system functionality [16].
For example, if a component fails, what would be its effect on the overall system functionality.
FEMA is usually performed at the start of the development phase once the design phase is completed.
Therefore, the result of FEMA can be used for product development and improve the process. FEMA uses
Risk Priority Number (RPN) as part of its quantitative analysis to identify the reliability rates for each
failure mode. RPN shows the risk of identified hazard based on severity and probability. RPN is calculated
as follows [16]:
RPN = Severity×
Probability of Occurrence×Detection Ranking
Researchers have investigated the benefits of performing FMEA to find the failure modes of software that
are complex to detect [17] [18] [19] . Such approaches can be used in the software design step to verify
and validate the software behaviors in isolation. However, they do not support the failure modes caused by
the interactions of software components in complex mission critical systems.
The result of FEMA provides all failure modes, their effects on the system, and quantitative predictions
on system hazards. However, a system can fail while all individual components performing their normal
operations such as the Mars Polar incident [14]. While FEMA provides analysis for a single point of failure,
it fails to consider multiple combinations of failures as it assumes that the system fails only if a component
fails.
B. Limitations of Traditional Approaches
Although traditional approaches can aid in addressing the safety of a complex systems, they fail to consider
the numerous interactions among different components, heterogeneity of the networks, and cyber connections.
Traditional methodologies use the decomposition approach on safety and consider safety as a reliability
issue. One of the issue of this approach is that it assumes any failure is the result of a linear chain of
undesired events that are caused from a single random component failure. However, most of security threats
in CPS happens when the system is compromised without any evident failure [14]. For example, due to lack
of authentication for control parameter modifications, an attacker is able to modify the control parameters
within the safe range. In this case, no failure happens but the system’s security is compromised. Therefore,
traditional approaches are often not able to address the security of complex systems.
Similarly, in the software security domain, methods such as Microsofts STRIDE/DREAD [20] or attack
tree [21] exist for threat and vulnerability analysis. While such software security analysis methods are mature,
their application to analysis of the security/safety-related incidents in CPS fails to consider the interactions
among different components as well as that of the control loops.
Recently, a new system based approach, Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) [14] is
introduced that does not consider safety a reliability issue and designed to address the need for an effective
approach for addressing safety in complex systems, such as a CPS, by considering interactions among
components in designing safe systems. In this paper, we show that STAMP can be adapted to be used as an
effective approach to address security as well as safety in a CPS.
C. System Theoretical Accident Model and Process (STAMP)
The System Theoretical Accident Model and Process (STAMP) is a system based approach to safety
and security. Figure 1 shows the STAMP model modules. The fundamental differences between STAMP
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and other traditional approaches is that STAMP looks at systems as dynamic systems rather than static and
consider safety and security of a system as a control problem not a reliability issue.
Figure 1: Modules of STAMP model [22]
According to STAMP, the individual components inside a system require control by enforcing sets of
constraints. STAMP assumes that the inadequate enforcement of the required constraints in all levels including
design and development can lead to a failure or an accident. In STAMP, any undesired events that lead to
system failure without component failure or miss interactions among components are called accident. STAMP
analyzes the hierarchical control structure by monitoring how the contextual control structures (i.e. all control
structures in different system levels) interact to have a safe and secure state. STAMP analysis helps in finding
the mitigations of the detected unsafe state, control loops, and their interactions, which were not possible in
the traditional approaches.
Having a holistic system thinking approach and considering interaction among components, STAMP also
not only allows the analysis of failures and unsafe states but also can be used to uncover states that are
related to organizational, cyber, and environmental failures. STAMP methodology is based on the following
Figure 2: Simple Control loop [14]
pillars [14]:
• Safety Control Structure
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• Safety Constraint
• Process Model
The safety control structure shows the hierarchy of all control loops in the system from higher levels to
lower levels [14]. Figure 2 shows a standard control loop. As shown in Figure 2, four components-Controller,
Actuators, Controlled Process, and Sensors- are the building blocks of a simple control loop. As soon as the
controller receives a command from the operator or other controllers, it runs the control algorithm associated
for the received commands. The result of this step generates a command signal that tells the actuator to
change the state of the controlled process. Then, the actuator informs the controlled process that the requested
command is executed by sending the related controlled variables. Finally, the sensors verify the system state
using the measurement variables and sends the result back to the controller. At this point, the controller
compare the system state with the desired state and determines the subsequent actions. The process model
that is run by the controller confirms the controlled process results.
Safety constraints are used to identify the safe and unsafe state of a system. They are derived from hazards
that are defined in the system specifications. The successful design and enforcement of safety constraint
increases system safety. In STAMP, these constraints are used to generate the system requirements that are
mandatory to maintain the system safety. STAMP analysis not only shows where insufficient control action
were in place but also shows which safety constraints were violated that brought the system to an unsafe
state.
Using safety approaches to address cyber security concerns had been explored previously [23] [24] [25]
[26]. In [27], the authors briefly claim that the STAMP methodology can be used both after an event to
prevent future such events and before any such event to anticipate threats and mitigate them. To the best of
our knowledge, this paper is the first STAMP-inspired detailed analysis of a major cyber physical system
attack, Stuxnet. Though this was primarily a post event analysis, we also identify a threat, T5, that was not
exploited by Stuxnet, as discussed later.
Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) [14] is an application of STAMP for accident analysis that we
utilize in this paper for the analysis of Stuxnet to show how STAMP can be used to address security risks
of a CPS at the design level.
The core building of CAST is to investigate the control structure dynamics for accident analysis [14]. This
investigation begins by looking at safety constraints and shows how the violation of a constraint related to
system security can lead to a system failure by providing its hierarchical cascading effects on the overall
system control structure.
The procedure for applying the CAST methodologies consists of 8 steps: 1) defining the system hazards,
2) finding safety constraints and safety requirements of the system, 3) defining the system control structure,
4) finding the possible events causing the failure or accident, 5) navigating through the system control
structure and finding the insufficient control on each level and how they can cause failure and unsafe states,
6) analyzing all interactions and finding the potential factors affecting interactions that can lead to failure, 7)
finding external (i.e. interactions with outside the boundary of a system) and dynamic factors that can affect
the overall safety structure at any time, and 8) producing recommendations and possible modifications on
the system design.
Although traditional methods such as FMEA and FTA share some properties with STAMP, the way STAMP
analyzes safety is different with that of traditional methodologies. STAMP uses control problem analysis
rather than reliability approach [14].
By showing what are the inadequate controls in the system control structure, CAST not only helps in the
investigation of an accident but also reveals the real causes of the accident that can be useful in designing
safe and secure systems. CAST has been applied to many industries such as aviation [28], railway [29],
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medicine [30] and pharmaceuticals [31]. In Section 5, we apply CAST to one of the best known CPS
malware, Stuxnet, and show how it can be used to identify the threats posed by Stuxnet. The results of the
CAST analysis will be discussed in detail.
Figure 3: Stuxnet Attack Process (the numbers indicate the step-number in the attack process)
4. OVERVIEW OF THE STUXNET CASE
Stuxnet was first discovered by the VirusBlockAda company in June 2010 and infected computers all
around the world. However, the majority of the computers were in Iran [32]. In the design of Stuxnet,
several complex techniques have been used, making it one of the most complicated malwares targeting a
CPS [33]. The process of infecting, activating, and launching the attack was carefully designed and probably
had been tested on similar plant architecture for high degree of an effective impact since Stuxnet did not
create any damage on other infected uranium enrichment facilities. Figure 3 shows the overall Stuxnet’s
attack vector both before and after activation.
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Inside a uranium enrichment infrastructure, PLCs are responsible for controlling centrifuges. As each PLC
is configured uniquely, the configuration documentations are needed for any type of targeted attacks. In the
case of Stuxnet, possible ways of accessing these documents can be either by the manufacturers, an insider,
third party contractors or even snooping malwares that are designed specifically to gather information about
an ICS in order to reverse engineer the actual architecture.
A. Stuxnet Infection Analysis
As the targeted uranium enrichment infrastructure was air-gapped (i.e. no cyber connections to outside
world), propagation of Stuxnet was probably done whether through a USB drive or other infected external
devices. Once the infected USB was connected to the maintenance laptop, Stuxnet was activated and infected
all the network devices particularly printers, computers, database servers, and application servers. Stuxnet
also infected major systems components ranging from SCADA to sensor readers as depicted in Figure 4. As
shown in Figure 4, the original data flow from controllers to centrifuges was modified by the Stuxnet and
these modification were not detected by safety measures in place.
Figure 4: Stuxnet Attack Digram
Stuxnet targeted Siemens S7/WinCC products that were commonly used in the Iranian uranium enrichment
infrastructure. The PLCs in the S7 product were the target element exploited to launch the attack. To achieve
this goal, Stuxnet utilized 3 zero-day vulnerabilities1 on Microsoft Windows operating systems to gain
root access required for manipulation of PLCs [34] [35] [36]. The first exploited vulnerability was based
on utilizing an old vulnerability that was used in the Conficker attack [34]. Stuxnet used the un-patched
Conficker flaw in remote procedure call (RPC) to infect the potential hosts on the network. Stuxnet utilized
the flaw to query the remote machines in the network to see whether Stuxnet is installed. If not, the infected
machine sends Stuxnet to the uninfected machine.
The second was a flaw in handling of .LNK file that was used to launch the malicious code on the infected
Windows machines [36]. .LNK files identify references to files. Traditionally, no test were done to verify
the file even by anti-viruses. This vulnerability is utilized in Stuxnet to reference a file on infected drive that
hold the virus. Once the virus is uploaded to the system and successfully infects the target machine, Stuxnet
hides the .LNK file as well as the source file. For automatically launching the payload, “Autorun.inf” file is
used to install the rootkit and loader as well as creating configuration and data files.
1Vulnerabilities that had not been detected by the vendor nor patched by most users due to fresh release of the patch
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The third exploited vulnerability was a bug in the Print Spooler Service that was utilized to transfer
the malicious code and then execute it on other machines in the network [35]. Utilizing this vulnerability,
Stuxnet copies itself to accessible network shares such as administrative shares, and printer servers that
are publicly available in the network. These vulnerabilities were patched by Microsoft after the detection
of Stuxnet. However, this shows attackers knew the flaws better than the vendors since all the fix patches
were created by the vendors after the Stuxnet was detected. It also shows patching the systems by the latest
security patches by the vendor does not necessarily bring the required level of security since there can
be serious vulnerabilities that are not yet detected by vendors. As operating systems are getting complex
and developed modular by specialized teams, lack of communications among core module developer teams
provides a ground for attackers to exploit vulnerabilities that arises from this flaw. Therefore, interaction
among different modules should also be considered for security analysis in parallel with the security of
individual module.
After the first load, Stuxnet performs the following tasks before launching any malicious activities against
centrifuges known as probe-phase: 1) secretly recording normal operations for a full operation cycle, 2)
playing the recording back to the controllers to maintain the appearance of a legitimate entity, 3) infecting
other computers, and 4) maintaining the list of infected computers, monitor spread, and determine success
in infecting attacked computers.
During the pre-attack phase Stuxnet utilizes various techniques to spread to other components in the
system. For example, it infects any USB drives that is connected to the infected machines. It also infects
the S7 project files-Siemens’s PLC project files. The infected project file subsequent openings on other
machines infect them with the malware. Utilizing the WinCC database connections was another technique
for spreading the malware. In this technique, the connection is used to infect the database. Once a database
is infected, further connections to the database by other machines infected them.
In the complex structure of the uranium enrichment infrastructure, two components were the target of
Stuxnet: functional components and software components. Functional components contain operating systems
as the core modules running on a propriety hardwares. These systems do not allow any type of modifications
on their modules by unauthorized users. Examples of functional components are automation systems such as
DCSs (distributed control system), engineering systems such as PLCs, and communication channels. Software
components are installed, configured, and updated by the systems’ user. Due to such characteristics, these
components are the main targets by the attackers since attackers can steal the authorization of system users
and modify software components on behalf of system users. The main software components that were
targeted by Stuxnet were SCADA, web-servers(used to report some statistics to remote clients on the same
network), sensors/Network adapters firmwares, CAS (central archive server), and database servers. Utilizing
the information gathered during the probe-phase, Stuxnet replaced the legitimate modules of both functional
and software components with illegitimate ones. Such modules were executing the commands designed by
Stuxnet designers while reporting something else to the operators and informing them that their commands
were successfully executed as shown in Figure 4. Readers are referred to [32] [37] [33] for more information
on how Stuxnet works.
5. STUXNET CAST ANALYSIS
Traditionally, bottom-up approaches are used to evaluate the safety of a system. However, as discussed in
Section 3 some hazards and threats were not identified by standard practices and that caused the breakdown
of most centrifuges. This shows why applying a linear traditional approach to a non-linear complex system2
2Non-linear complexity refers to where cause and effect are intractable or not easily described or specified.
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was not enough. The security of a non-linear system is not solely directly proportional to the security of
individual components. Therefore, a new approach that utilizes a system-thinking approach such as STAMP
is required. The intent of our analysis is show whether the STAMP methodology, in particular to CAST,
could have discovered the hazards that led to the centrifuges break down in the Stuxnet case. If those hazards
were identifiable using STAMP, its recommended mitigations could have been applied in the design phase
to prevent the same hazards to happen in new or current systems. Also, we show hazards identified by
CAST that could not be found by traditional methodologies such as FMEA. Thus, our analysis confirms the
advantage of applying a system model in security analysis that can improve the overall safety and security
of complex systems.
In CAST each individual component of a complex CPS is analyzed in terms of safety to form a safety
perception. Such analysis considers parameters such as incoming data, its source, and interactions with other
components inside the operational system. The involved components in the analysis are then linked together
to form larger sub-systems until a complete system is formed. However, the interactions between components
as depicted in Figure 5 are usually not considered in other traditional approaches, making them insufficient
to address the security needs of a CPS. Each link between two components in a loop is labeled with the first
letter(s) of the originating component followed by the first letter(s) of the terminating component as shown
in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Control loop
In the Stuxnet case the system (i.e. uranium enrichment infrastructure) is operated as follows. The operator
may either issue a command to the centrifuges or other controlling components through SCADA or load
a predefined operation configuration file that issues the previously defined operations sequences. Once the
requested operation is performed within the desirable timeframe, the results are sent back to user for its
verification. If the average turn-around time for the requested operation is delayed, then the system may go
into a hazardous state.
The system allows the operator to either manually check the correctness of the results or use an automatic
verification algorithm that runs a specific simulation for each operation. The algorithm compares the result
of simulation with that of the received results for verification purposes. The operator is also able to monitor
centrifuges status, PLC’s status, as well as other users activities.
After the operator or the automatic verification module verifies the correctness of the requested operation,
the system automatically resets itself by performing the required readjustment process for the next new
requested operation or the next operation in the sequence.
Traditionally, such a system undergoes serious risk analysis using traditional methodologies such FMEA to
not only find the possible hazards caused by the specific system design but also implement the recommended
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Figure 6: System Threats
mitigations derived from the analysis [38]. The case system probably had followed the same process as a
standard practice recommended for all uranium enrichment infrastructure.
The user interacts with the system using the graphical user interface that records the user’s commands as
well as showing the user the result of its requested operations. Figure 5 shows the typical operation loop
in ICS. Lack of properly controlling such a loop as well as other system-wide loops were the main reasons
that the Stuxnet attack went through as we show later in this section.
Figure 7: System security requirements and constraints
In the Stuxnet case, as described in the previous section, the interactions among operators, SCADA
systems, PLCs, and sensors were intercepted and used to launch the malicious operations. As we later show
by analyzing all the control loops within the system boundary, lack of authentication and result verification
on feedback loops was also evident in the system architecture that made the system vulnerable to threats
imposed by Stuxnet.
A. System threat identification
As discussed in Section 3, the first step in CAST is to define the system and hazards related to the
accident. The system is the uranium enrichment infrastructure controlled by a set of automated tools such
as SCADAs, PLCs, Sensors, and a communication network.
We define threats by extending the definition of hazards in STAMP as explained in Section 3 to consider
states that are not hazardous but are undesirable by the users. For example, a centrifuge can spin within
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the safe speed range but not with the speed requested by the operators. These states are caused mainly by
attackers who circumvent the security measures to execute their control actions with parameters within the
safe range. Using the definition of threats and the Stuxnet case analysis discussed in Section 5, most of
the relevant threats within the studied system’s boundary are listed in Figure 6. These threats are identified
based on our analysis of missing controls and the threats posed by Stuxnet. The description of each threats
is as follows:
Figure 8: System components
1) The T1 threat of reporting fake results to the controllers is highly dangerous and can lead to issuing
undesired operations from the controllers with a physical manifestation. As discussed in Section 5, the
reported fake results to SCADAs led to not recognizing the actual damages to the centrifuges by the
operators.
2) T2 is the threat where the system executes the requested operations by Stuxnet rather than that of the
operators. Running centrifuges with the highest speed and switching their speed to the lowest speed
without considering the speed requested by SCADA or the operator is an example such a threat. These
threats are not recognized by the controllers in the system as such attacks hides the actual situation
from the controllers, imposing another threat- T3.
3) T3 is the threat where malicious operations such those explained in T2 are concealed from the process
view of controllers such as SCADAs. Since the design intent of the system was that always the correct
results are available to the SCADAs, no proper controller verification step, such as a signal by a
controller indicating whether the operation is performed correctly, was used in the original design to
address such flaws.
4) T4 is the threat where the whole system was blind on the actual operations that were happening within
centrifuges. Usually the actual results are reported by the centrifuge sensors to SCADAs. The original
design intent did not consider result verification and reporting authentication to address this issue.
5) T5, the threat of delayed reporting, was not directly exploited by Stuxnet but the system was susceptible
to such a threat by Stuxnet as it was sitting as a middleware between controllers and physical devices,
in this case centrifuges and were able to delay the reception of results by SCADAs. This may lead to
launching undesired operations by SCADAs due to lack of results.
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B. System Security Constraint and Security Requirements
The second step in the CAST analysis is to define the security constraints based on hierarchical control
systems. Also, security requirements associated to each security constraints should also be defined to ensure
that the security constraints are not violated. The security constraints and security requirements of Stuxnet
case are shown in Figure 7
As it is shown in Figure 7, a security constraint is defined for each identified threat shown in Figure 6.
For example, for T1, the defined security constraint indicates the receiving of the correct results by the
controllers. As mentioned earlier, failure to enforce such constraint led to the T1 in the Stuxnet case. The
security requirements that addresses this constraint is to ensure that always the correct results are reported to
the controllers. Without the correct results, the operators are blind to the centrifuges’ status and are unable to
react properly as happened in the Stuxnet case. Therefore, to avoid such threats, there is a need for a result
verification controller for all devices producing either intermediate or final results. This security requirement
was neither included nor enforced in the original design of the case system. The centrifuges should spin
Figure 9: Hierarchical Internal Control loops
with a desirable speed requested by PLCs. Therefore, there is a need for a controller that checks whether
the desired operations are performed. The security constraint and security requirement associated with such
threat (i.e. T2) is shown in Figure 7. The ensuring requirements addresses this threat by making sure that
only the legitimate operations are performed.
Other security constraint and requirements for other identified threats are also shown Figure 7. The system
should be able to identify all operation tampering or communication tampering to avoid T3 or T4. Addressing
these threats require immediate intervention undesired damage to the system.
C. System Control Structure
After identifying threats, security constraints and requirements, the next step is to investigate the
hierarchical control structure of the system for lack of controls. In the Stuxnet case the physical system
is the uranium enrichment infrastructure that needs to be investigated. The critical components of the case
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system and their functionalities are shown in Figure 8. It is noteworthy that there are many other components.
However, we show only the critical components related to the Stuxnet case.
Figure 10: Inter layer system decomposition
The system can be decomposed into three core subsystems: the operator subsystem that contains all the
user interfaces, control algorithms, and verification systems, the control subsystem that contains all SCADAs,
PLCs, and device controllers, and the communication subsystem that contains all network communications
among different entities in the system. The system is complex since it contains numerous components within
many layers. Thus, we start by the first control loop at the top level with the operator that is shown earlier
in Figure 5. This is the operator control loop that is present in almost all CPS. It shows how the operator
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interacts with the system. The GUI enables operators to request operations such as centrifuge speed increase,
insert initial values, changes centrifuges or PLCs settings, and capture the reported results. The GUI sends
the requested commands to SCADA that needs to be performed. The verification of the requested operations
are sent back to the user.
The full control loop is referred to by putting all the labels together. For example, OG-GS-SO-OO refers to
the basic control loop showed in Figure 5. After showing the top level control structure, the components within
that structure is further decomposed. In this paper, as an example, we only decompose one of the critical
components in the top level that is SCADA. Similar process can be applied to other components as well.
The SCADA decomposition in the control structure of the case system is shown in Figure 9. At this level,
SCADA becomes a controller for the three lower level controlled processes: Centrifuge speed controller,
Enrichment controller, and the centrifuge sensor controller. The centrifuge speed controller maintain the
desired speed of the centrifuges. The enrichment controller monitors the level of desired enrichment. The
centrifuge sensor controllers captures the centrifuges sensor data.
Finally, we decompose the above three controllers to show the interactions among controllers. Figure 10
shows the detailed decomposition of the three critical controllers. As shown in Figure 10, all of these three
controllers are interacting with each other creating the final desired operation by the system. Such functional
decomposition is critical to identify the lack of control or inadequate control among the critical components
that interact with each other. The next step is to investigate the control loops. The main purpose of analyzing
Figure 11: CAST Results for the Control Loops
control loops is to find violation of security constraints that may be caused by other interacting control loops.
Based on the overall control structure and the three decomposition levels as depicted in Figure 5, 9, and 10,
the critical control loops that are interacting with each other are in the table shown in Figure 12.
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The identified control loops should be investigated for the factors causing the identified threats as shown
in Figure 6. In CAST there are several classifications of control loops that can cause unsafe states [14].
Using traditional classifications in CAST and the control loops in the table shown in Figure 12, the threats
are listed in Figure 11. The key to the design of Stuxnet was that the malware would be able to interact with
the system components as a legitimate entity in the systems. Since the were no component authentication
mechanisms in place as evident in Figure 10, Stuxnet took advantage of this design flaw in order to launch its
malicious operations. The authentication mechanisms using protocols such as [39] should be in place among
each interacting components of Figure 10 to avoid malicious injections of commands or parameters. Once
all the core system components are infected, Stuxnet then issues malicious operations from each infected
components.
From Figure 10, we can also notice that the actual sensors results are not passed securely to the controllers
since there is no secure channel between sensors and controllers. Therefore, the results can be modified by
Stuxnet along the way. There is no controller to check the validity of the results. There can be result
verification controller that runs the simulated version of the requested operation and compares the received
results with that simulated ones to predicted any tampering with results.
Figure 12: Critical control loops of the system
Figure 11 shows the 35 threats associated with the control loops in Figure 12. Detailed analysis of control
loops and their components can reveal threats that are directly related to the Stuxnet case. 35 potential threats
were generated for all the analyzed control loops that most of them were directly related to the Stuxnet case.
For example, a contributing factor to T2 can be identified in each of the control loops that is “lack of
input verification associated with each operation/process”. Similarly, “Lack of results verification/validation
module” is a contributing factor to T1. This could lead to the situation that all the received data can be
considered trusted and may have undesired impact on the other interacting control loops. Our analysis shows
that STAMP can be useful to identify threats in complex systems that are mainly caused by uncontrolled
interactions, something that is missing in the standard practices such as FMEA or FTA.
D. Result Discussion
As it is shown in Figure 11, 35 threats were identified based on the analyzed control structure. These threats
can be categorized into the following five broad categories: (i) lack of control in verifying inputs and outputs
for each individual components in the control loops, (ii) lack of control in verifying the source command
issuer and destination command received, (iii) lack of control in predicting emerging effects created by the
lower-level or upper-level control loops, (iv) lack of control in verifying the authenticity of the software
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING 17
pieces used in system components such as SCADAs, PLCs, and devices’ firmwares, and (v) lack of control
in creating secure tunnel for communication between the components in the network
Although sixteen control loops within the system boundary were identified in Figure 10, the five loops
that are shown in Figure 12 are the major contributors that had a direct impact to the identified threats. The
combination of the identified threats led to the ultimate goal of Stuxnet- disrupting the complete uranium
enrichment process. Our CAST analysis found the threats associated with the involved control loops that
could be utilized to put required measures to avoid threats imposed by Stuxnet. As it is shown in Figure 5,
the control loop OG-GS-SO-OO, is the highest control loop in the system that requires the correct operation
result reported to the operator in order to maintain the correct sequence of operations. Violation of such
constraint can be led to undesired operations. Therefore, having a result verification controller can protect
the system against such threat.
As another example, the control loop C3-C3C2-S5-C20 could not detect the malicious speed request
coming from an authorized source. An analysis of FMEA could not detect such a threat as a potential threat
because based on such analysis as long as a sensor is healthy and works properly (getting the requests
and responds to them), the functionality is not disrupted and hence the system could be considered safe.
However, such a threat could be identified by CAST and proper mitigations could be placed accordingly.
Operation result verification (ORV) at lower-levels can be done easily using local verifiers independent of
the control structure flow, improving the accuracy of final results reported to the operators. In addition such
ORV can monitor the physical components’ (such as sensors) integrity and performance.
Additionally, even with the presence of an OVR, there is no verification for the sequence of results reported
from lower-level loops to the higher-level loops in the hierarchical control structure. For example, a malware
such as Stuxnet can report the results (fake results) to the higher-level control loops before the lower-level
control loops could verify the results. Therefore, the higher-control loops take actions based on the received
results that are not the actual expected results. This is an example of not defining the appropriate behavior of
the system that makes the process model incomplete and it is one of the frequent forms of deficiencies that
occurs due to incomplete process model [14]. To address such threats, the process model of the controller
should either perform a source verification for any received results by utilizing a light-weighted public/private
crypto system or use a secure communication tunnel with its components such as secure socket tunneling
protocol (SSTP).
Our CAST analysis facilitated the process of understanding a complex control structure such as a uranium
enrichment infrastructure and the relationship among its control loops. As we showed in our analysis, even
though some of the threats were the result of insufficient access control at lower-level loops, most of them
were the result of inadequate control over the interactions among the system components and their associated
control loops. The lesson learned from our CAST analysis can be used to prevent threats in other CPSs.
For example, cars are becoming more intelligent these days and numerous components have to interact with
each other to accomplish a task. It is estimated that intelligent cars have as much/more code than a fighter
jet in near future [40]. Attacks like Stuxnet can cause the car’s motor to overspeed similar to the Iranian
centrifuges, creating a catastrophic event. Therefore, system designers can utilize the STAMP framework to
identify threats in a complex environment that runs mostly through complex interactions among its numerous
components.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The design of security for cyber-physical systems must take into account several characteristics common
to such systems. Among these are interactions between the cyber and physical environment, distributed
management and control, real-time requirements, and geographic distribution. This paper discusses these
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characteristics and suggests a design analysis approach that better integrates security into the core design
of the system. We applied CAST on a sample case study. Numerous threats were identified that highlight
some of the missing design requirements pieces needed in the original design intent to avoid security threats
imposed by the studied case.
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